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Abstract 
To enhance employee performance, many organizations are increasingly using electronic performance 
monitoring (EPM). The relationship between the frequency of EPM use and employee performance is 
examined in 2 field studies. In Study 1, which uses a unique longitudinal data set, results reveal that 
shorter time lags between 2 consecutive employee performance assessments are related to better task 
performance as indicated by call quality metrics. A second field study using matched supervisor–
employee and EPM system data is conducted in 2 call centers to extend these results and to focus more 
directly on the supervisors’ use of EPM and its relationship with additional performance criteria: 
counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) and organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs). Results 
indicate that more frequent supervisory use of EPM is associated with better task performance and OCB. 
However, supervisory use of EPM was not significantly related to CWB. 
Electronic performance monitoring (EPM) systems—electronic technologies used to observe, record, and 
analyze information on employee performance (Stanton, 2000; US Congress, OTA, 1987)—have changed 
how supervisors monitor their subordinates (Ilgen & Pulakos, 1999). In contrast to traditional methods of 
monitoring, such as direct observation or meetings, which are undertaken at discrete time intervals and 
without the use of technology, EPM systems assess quantifiable aspects of employee performance 
continually (Hesketh & Neal, 1999; Stanton, 2000).In addition EPM systems also enable capturing 
qualitative observational data on specific service behaviors that supervisors and other organizational units 
such as quality teams subsequently assess (George, 1996; Lund, 1992; Stanton, 2000). These 
sophisticated systems can therefore provide supervisors the tools they need to assess employee 
performance more comprehensively (Ilgen & Pulakos, 1999) and to better align employee and 
organizational interests (Fayol, 1916; Simon, 1946). Given the increasing prevalence of EPM (American 
Management Association, 2005; National Workrights Institute, 2004), it is important to understand 
whether the frequency of supervisory use of EPM—critical in traditional monitoring (Komaki, 1986)—
enhances performance and achieves the desired interest-alignment objective of EPM. Theoretical and 
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practical imperatives call for examining whether EPM functions as an “invisible eye” that aligns 
intraorganizational interests and enhances employee performance. 
However, empirical evidence informing this question is limited, particularly from field studies. Most 
research on the EPM–performance relationship consists of laboratory experiments that find, generally, 
that EPM facilitates performance for simple tasks (e.g., Davidson & Henderson, 2000; Kolb & 
Aiello, 1997). Of note, studies report experimental findings for the EPM–performance relationship only 
for in-role task performance, but little research considers the other performance dimensions such as 
organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) and counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs). 
Furthermore, the relatively few field studies of EPM largely focus on employees’ perceptions of the 
importance the organization places on different performance dimensions (e.g., production quantity vs. 
work quality) but not on the actual performance on these dimensions (e.g., Grant, Higgins, & 
Irving, 1988; Irving, Higgins, & Safayeni, 1986). Moreover, EPM research reports mixed evidence about 
the efficacy of EPM systems with productivity benefits contrasted with concerns related to privacy, 
fairness, and employee stress (see Bates & Holton, 1995; Chalykoff  & Kochan, 1989; Lund, 1992). 
Finally, although by design EPM has two key constituents, supervisors using EPM systems and 
employees who are electronically monitored through these systems, EPM field studies primarily focus on 
the latter. Although important, that emphasis largely neglects the supervisor's crucial role (for 
experimental exceptions, see Alge, Ballinger, & Green, 2004; Zweig & Scott, 2007). This omission is 
important because, as Komaki (1986) observed, the frequency of supervisory monitoring—traditional 
observational monitoring—is a key differentiator between effective and noneffective supervisors and one 
that is likely to prevail in EPM settings as well (Alge et al., 2004; Stanton, 2000). 
In light of these conflicting and incomplete findings, rigorously assessing the importance of EPM in field 
settings is crucial. My primary objective in this study is thus to determine how frequently supervisors use 
EPM systems and how the frequency relates to employee performance. I draw on agency theory 
(Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which suggests that greater information allows supervisors to 
better monitor subordinates and to align subordinates’ and supervisors’ interests (and therefore align with 
organizational interests). To obtain deeper understanding of the relationship between EPM use and 
employee performance, specifically task performance, I undertook Study 1 using a unique longitudinal 
data set of objective call quality assessments in a call center firm. To complement Study 1's objective 
EPM data, in Study 2 I drew data from multiple sources: supervisors, employees, and EPM system data 
provided by quality units from two different call center organizations. The multisource data allowed me to 
focus more directly on supervisors’ reports of EPM use while simultaneously incorporating a more 
comprehensive view of employee performance in the areas of task, OCB, and CWB. Collectively, this 
research addresses calls to better evaluate EPM contextual influences by drawing data from field settings, 
and by incorporating objective and subjective data to thoroughly assess EPM use and its relationship with 
multiple performance dimensions (see Johns, 2006). Thus, this research contributes to our knowledge of 
the essential role of technology for employee performance in technology-mediated contexts (see 
Hesketh & Neal, 1999). 
 
Development of Hypotheses 
Most research on the EPM–performance relationship has focused on task performance and has primarily 
used experimental methods. For instance, social facilitation theory (Zajonc, 1965) suggests that when 
other people are physically present, individuals perform complex tasks more poorly but perform simple 
tasks better. Drawing on that theory, Aiello and Svec (1993) investigated whether such social facilitation 
effects operate when EPM provides an “electronic presence.” They reported that participants in both 
electronic and supervisory monitoring conditions performed a complex task more poorly than did 
participants who were not monitored or were monitored in a group. On the other hand, Griffith (1993) 
reported better performance on a simple experimental task for electronically monitored study participants 
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compared with nonmonitored participants, although the differences were not statistically significant. 
Other studies using both complex and simple tasks have observed social facilitation effects; electronically 
monitored participants demonstrated higher performance on simple tasks but not on complex tasks 
(Davidson & Henderson, 2000; Kolb & Aiello, 1997). Overall, the experimental results suggest that EPM 
facilitates performance for simple tasks but hinders performance for complex tasks. 
Field studies in the EPM literature have mainly focused on employee views of the importance of different 
performance attributes. For example, Grant et al. (1988) surveyed monitored and nonmonitored 
employees in the same firm and asked them which performance attribute they believed was most critical 
in their performance evaluations. Although 80% of monitored employees considered production quantity 
the main attribute affecting their performance ratings, most nonmonitored employees (85%) considered 
work quality the most important attribute. Irving and colleagues reported similar results: Employees in 
two organizations with EPM systems stated that managers placed a higher emphasis on quantitative 
aspects of work and a lower emphasis on quality of work, compared to employees in three organizations 
without EPM systems (Irving et al., 1986). Although these findings suggest that EPM can influence 
employees’ attention to specific performance domains, they provide little information whether this results 
in changes in employee performance (Bates & Holton, 1995). 
Overall, experimental studies have focused primarily on comparing electronic versus traditional forms of 
monitoring, whereas field studies have focused on soliciting employees’ preferences for different aspects 
of task performance. In addition, both experimental and field studies in EPM have primarily focused on 
the employees’ perspective, leaving an important question unaddressed: How does the frequency of 
supervisory use of EPM—critical in traditional observational monitoring (Komaki, 1986)—relate to 
employee performance? A related question is to understand the effects of supervisory use of EPM across 
the performance domain given that job performance is multidimensional (Campbell, 1999; Dalal, 2005; 
Rotundo & Sackett, 2002). To examine these questions, I draw on the theoretical perspectives of agency 
theory and social facilitation theory (see Alge et al., 2004; Stanton, 2000). 
 
Supervisory Use of EPM and Task Performance 
Agency theory (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) focuses on how work is delegated from a 
principal (here, the supervisor) to an agent (here, the subordinate) who does the work. Eisenhardt (1989) 
illustrated how agency theory metaphorically views the relationship between supervisor and subordinate 
as a contract for ascertaining the most efficient agreement between the two parties. Sometimes, however, 
moral hazard renders contracts inefficient (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), which is more likely to occur 
when asymmetric information exists between the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). For example, 
supervisors may lack accurate performance information about their subordinates and consequently are 
limited in eliciting performance improvements. 
However, if supervisors cannot directly observe subordinates’ performance, organizations can invest in 
information systems such as EPM (when the systems are less costly than other alternatives) to glean 
performance information (Eisenhardt, 1989). For instance, call center supervisors can use the EPM 
system to determine how well customer service representatives (CSRs) are performing on key metrics, 
such as their average time for handling calls, and use this information to suggest performance 
improvements. Agency theory predicts that this greater information facilitates better monitoring, which 
serves to align supervisors’ and subordinates’ interests. Experimental results are supportive: Particularly 
for simple tasks, electronically monitored participants demonstrate higher performance (Davidson & 
Henderson, 2000; Kolb & Aiello, 1997) indicating that greater performance information gathered through 
EPM mitigates agency problems caused by asymmetric information between supervisors and 
subordinates. Therefore, based on agency theory, I expect that greater use of EPM will be associated with 
favorable task performance effects. 
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Based on Komaki's (1986) work in traditional observational monitoring, using EPM systems to gather 
employee performance information can be conceptualized either as (a) objective measures of EPM 
frequency based on the actual time between EPM assessments or (b) subjective supervisor reports on how 
frequently they electronically monitor focal subordinates. Although these alternative conceptualizations 
are consistent with the agency theory reasoning that greater EPM facilitates employees’ task performance, 
nuances occur in their rationale for favorable performance effects. In addition, the specific 
operationalization of EPM frequency differs based on the conceptualization, which prompts a more 
refined examination of the frequency of EPM–task performance relationship. 
 
Objective Measures of EPM Frequency 
The first conceptualization of the frequency of EPM use is based on the time between EPM assessments. 
According to social facilitation theory (Zajonc, 1965), EPM may enhance task performance because it 
serves as an “electronic presence” (Aiello & Svec, 1993) driving employees to perform better because 
they are aware of being evaluated (i.e., evaluation apprehension; Cottrell, 1972). Furthermore, in the 
presence of others, employees want to impress observers favorably and present a particular image of 
themselves (i.e., self-presentation; Baumeister, 1982; Goffman, 1959). Evaluation apprehension and self-
presentation undergird social facilitation effects by increasing employees’ arousal levels and desire to 
achieve task performance expectations. In other words, more frequent EPM would signal that the 
organization focuses strongly on evaluation, which would increase employees’ evaluation apprehension 
and, in turn, enhance their task performance (see Brewer & Ridgway, 1998). Thus, according to this 
social facilitation explanation, longer time lags between EPM assessments will decrease employees’ drive 
to meet task performance expectations. In sum, social facilitation theory and agency theory suggest that 
longer time lags between EPM assessments will adversely affect task performance. 
 Hypothesis 1: Time between two consecutive EPM assessments is negatively related to task 
performance. 
Subjective Supervisory Reports of EPM Use 
Another way to conceptualize EPM is based on supervisors’ subjective assessment of how frequently they 
electronically monitor their subordinates. Research on traditional observational monitoring shows that 
more frequent monitoring is essential to motivate subordinates to achieve work-related goals 
(Komaki, 1986). The frequency of supervisory monitoring signals the importance of the work to 
subordinates and directs their attention to its completion (Larson & Callahan, 1990). That is, by cueing 
subordinates on valued aspects of performance, more frequent supervisory monitoring aims to enhance 
performance. As discussed previously, this reasoning is congruent with the propositions of agency theory: 
More frequent supervisory use of EPM will help mitigate agency problems related to asymmetric 
information between supervisors and subordinates (Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly, I expect that greater 
supervisory use of EPM (based on supervisors’ judgments of how much they electronically monitor their 
subordinates) will facilitate task performance. 
 Hypothesis 2: Supervisory use of EPM is positively related to subordinates’ task performance. 
Supervisory Use of EPM and CWBs 
CWB “refers to any intentional behavior on the part of an organization member viewed by the 
organization as contrary to its legitimate interests” (Sackett, 2002, p. 5) and is another vital dimension of 
performance (Campbell, 1999; Dalal, 2005; Rotundo & Sackett, 2002). It is noteworthy that the definition 
of CWB explicitly recognizes the role of incongruent interests between the organization and its members 
in classifying behaviors as counterproductive—incongruent interests that agency theory suggests might be 
alleviated by monitoring. CWBs can include a wide range of behaviors such as theft, tardiness, violence, 
accidents, sabotage, absenteeism, sexual harassment, and drug and alcohol abuse (Ones, 2002). For 
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parsimony and to focus explicitly on the performance domain, this study will focus on the 
counterproductive behaviors that Robinson and Bennett (1995) classified as production deviance (e.g., 
intentionally working slowly, taking excessive breaks). 
From an agency theory perspective, employee-shirking behaviors are an example of CWBs in which 
employees avoid working as hard as expected (Eisenhardt, 1989; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Agency 
theory contends that shirking may occur because agents (employees) know more about their work efforts 
than do principals (supervisors). The resulting information asymmetry may prompt employees to act 
opportunistically by shirking (Eisenhardt, 1989). Specific monitoring mechanisms, such as EPM, help 
counteract information asymmetry by curtailing opportunistic subordinate behavior and obtaining more 
accurate performance information (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980). Substantial research has illustrated 
that monitoring may combat shirking behavior. For instance, Eisenhardt (1985) found that greater 
monitoring mechanisms (e.g., budgeting systems) yielded more accurate performance information about 
salespersons in specialty stores. 
Incorporating these agency theory arguments, Alge et al. (2004) reported that when team leaders’ 
dependence on their subordinates was higher, which could create information asymmetry and opportunist 
subordinate behavior, they engaged in more intense monitoring. To supplement these experimental 
results, Alge et al. (2004) conducted a qualitative study of 22 managers. Results of this qualitative study 
indicated that EPM was used to elicit accurate information on subordinate CWBs, specifically those 
related to production deviance. One manager reported monitoring employees when it seemed that certain 
workers were starting to slack on the job. Another manager said that “lack of productivity” would prompt 
monitoring to “find out what the employee was really doing” (p. 400). Similarly, in a call center setting, a 
supervisor can use EPM data to determine whether a CSR is taking too many breaks and then use the 
information to combat shirking. These illustrations are consistent with agency theory arguments that 
supervisory use of EPM can help mitigate subordinate production deviance when supervisors cannot 
directly observe subordinate behavior. To this end, monitoring mechanisms would alleviate agency 
problems manifested in CWBs. Accordingly, I expect that supervisory use of EPM will help mitigate 
CWBs. 
 Hypothesis 3: Supervisory use of EPM is negatively related to subordinates’ CWBs. 
Supervisory Use of EPM and OCBs 
OCBs, another facet of job performance, are defined as “contributions to the maintenance and 
enhancement of the social and psychological context that supports task performance” (Organ, 1997, 
p. 91). Broadly, OCBs are employee behaviors that go beyond the call of duty (Bolino & Turnley, 2003) 
and reflect a latent construct representing “behavioral manifestations of positive cooperativeness at work” 
(LePine, Erez, & Johnson, 2002, p. 61). Because predictability and personalization represent a core 
dichotomy in customer service interactions (Surprenant & Solomon, 1987; Wallace, Eagleson, & 
Waldresee, 2000), examining citizenship behaviors is especially intriguing. For example, call center 
customer-service interactions are designed to be predictable so that all customers receive standardized 
service levels (Batt & Moynihan, 2002). Monitoring processes inform employees, implicitly and 
explicitly, that the organization desires certain work behaviors, particularly those that focus on task 
performance (Larson & Callahan, 1990). Monitoring thus emphasizes in-role behaviors the organization 
expects. Although traditional job responsibilities do not include OCBs, they contribute positively to the 
organization's social and psychological context (see LePine et al., 2002). By focusing employees on task 
performance, EPM may hinder OCBs. 
From an agency theory perspective, monitoring may restrict certain employee behaviors. Supervisors and 
subordinates have differing interests that can cause problems in rewarding task performance while 
sustaining OCBs (Deckop, Mangel, & Cirka, 1999). The supervisors’ interest would require the employee 
to maximize in-role or task performance, at the cost of likely decreasing OCBs (Deckop et al., 1999). 
That is, when organizations explicitly specify behaviors to be rewarded, employees will be less likely to 
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exhibit unrewarded behaviors such as OCBs (Morrison, 1996). In accordance, research has reported 
negative and direct effects between supervisory monitoring methods such as observations and formal 
meetings with specific dimensions of OCBs (Niehoff & Moorman, 1993). A related finding shows that 
employees are more creative under less supervisory monitoring (Zhou, 2003). Along the same lines, 
because EPM systems comprehensively monitor task performance to ensure predictability in service 
interactions, generally helpful behaviors in the workplace are likely to suffer. Consequently, supervisory 
use of EPM would cue employees to the importance of task performance factors and adversely affect their 
performance of OCBs. 
On the other hand, alternative theoretical perspectives and empirical findings suggest that supervisory use 
of EPM may positively affect subordinates’ OCBs. First, the EPM literature shows some contradictory 
findings when considering performance dimensions other than task performance. EPM systems highlight 
performance expectations, but in emphasizing task performance they may also stress the importance of 
other performance facets. For instance, Grant and Higgins (1989) reported that if employees believe that 
managers ascribe greater importance to the number of calls handled over the customer service, the 
employees nevertheless also increase their focus on customer service. As a result, Grant and Higgins 
(1989) contended that managerial attention to one facet of employee performance stimulates employees to 
value all performance facets. Furthermore, some experimental work suggests that EPM causes no 
compromises between service quality and quantity (e.g., Nebeker & Tatum, 1993). 
A related but separate view suggests that employees may use impression management tactics to influence 
supervisory evaluations (Bolino, 1999). Furthermore, the odds of impression management may be higher 
under electronic monitoring; employees may be motivated to perform more citizenship acts because they 
believe supervisors will observe them. This reasoning is also consistent with emerging research on OCB 
role definitions, which suggests that employees may perceive that the organization essentially requires 
and rewards OCBs (e.g., Kamdar, McAllister, & Turban, 2006; Morrison, 1994; Tepper, Lockhart, & 
Hoobler, 2001). 
Overall, two contradictory sets of arguments govern the supervisory use of EPM–OCB relationship. 
Based on agency theory and empirical findings from traditional monitoring, supervisory use of EPM may 
inhibit OCBs. Based on the broader job performance literature and some evidence from EPM research, 
however, supervisory use of EPM may enhance OCBs. Given the polarity inherent in these arguments, 
rather than offering a formal hypothesis, I examine the relationship between supervisory use of EPM and 
OCB as a research question: 
 Research Question: Is there a relationship between supervisory use of EPM and subordinates’ 
OCBs? 
Overview of the Present Research 
I tested the EPM–performance hypotheses by conducting two field studies in call centers. Call centers use 
EPM to continually collect a stream of performance information that permits supervisors to track 
employee performance in “real time” and includes a wide variety of work activities that can be potentially 
monitored (e.g., work pace, breaks, and accuracy; Aiello & Kolb, 1995; Holman, Chissick, & 
Totterdell, 2002). Although EPM systems can continually monitor employees and provide information on 
objective metrics, supervisors still must assess specific behaviors—an aspect labeled service 
observation—either by listening in during a customer transaction or by accessing digital records of the 
call later (George, 1996; Lund, 1992; Stanton, 2000). In general, of the total calls the CSR handles in a 
call center, only a few are assessed on service behaviors; the call center industry estimates that 75% of 
call centers monitor approximately four to five calls per employee per month (Incoming Calls 
Management Institute [ICMI], 2005). 
Because service observation requires supervisors to devote more time and be more involved, many call 
center organizations also establish quality assessment units to track, observe, and evaluate CSR 
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performance (ICMI, 2005). Some call centers use quality departments to assess performance internally; 
others use external consulting firms, primarily because consulting firms specialize in service observation 
and provide benchmarking metrics across call center organizations. Third-party monitoring is consistent 
with the principles of quality assessment (Crosby, 1980; Juran, 1974) because external assessors are less 
likely to be biased by internal organizational (client) dynamics. As discussed below, the two studies in the 
present research incorporate these different organizational structures that call center firms adopt for 
electronically monitoring their employees. 
Study 1 differs from Study 2 in its emphasis on external rather than internal assessments of EPM. This 
facilitates directly measuring the time between performance assessments and provides a more objective 
measure of frequency of EPM use. Therefore Study 1 primarily examines the relationship between degree 
of use of EPM, in terms of objective assessment of the time between EPM assessments and task 
performance. Study 2 uses surveys that directly assess supervisory use of EPM and its relationship across 
the three employee performance dimensions of task, CWB, and OCB. Thus, it is necessary to take a 
complementary view of both studies: Study 1 provides a more objective understanding of frequency of 
EPM by measuring the time between two consecutive assessments and tests Hypothesis 1; Study 2 
provides an understanding of the frequency of supervisory use of EPM based on an individual 
supervisor's perspective and facilitates a test of the other hypotheses. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants, procedures, and setting 
As mentioned above, Study 1 focuses on external rather than internal assessments of EPM. I obtained data 
on EPM assessments for “Finco,” the call center of a financial services firm, from “Consultco,” a third-
party consulting firm (organization names are changed for confidentiality). Both firms are U.S. based. 
Finco's customers call primarily to resolve issues related to financial trade requests and account statuses. 
A group of assessors at Consultco rated a random selection of CSRs’ performance in handling these client 
calls. Only one assessor, however, rated each of these randomly selected calls. CSRs at Finco were aware 
that their performance would be assessed and were provided their performance evaluation soon after the 
assessment took place. 
Consultco assessors were specifically trained in service observations and were also skilled in identifying 
differences among superior, acceptable, and poor service based on a template of behaviors developed in 
collaboration with Finco. Consultco made ratings on specific customer service behaviors as well an 
overall employee performance score (discussed below) accessible to Finco supervisors and CSRs weekly. 
Over a 3-month period, assessment data for 4,207 calls were available for 248 of Finco's CSRs. 
Measures 
Employee performance 
In consultation with Finco's subject matter experts, Consultco organizational consultants, who have PhD 
degrees in industrial-organizational psychology, developed a set of measures to assess performance based 
on 20 items measuring different aspects of service observation: service orientation (e.g., opening call 
appropriately), issue identification (e.g., obtaining the right information), issue resolution (e.g., providing 
thorough information), communication (e.g., projecting enthusiastic tone), and call management (e.g., 
using time efficiently). Based on these items, Consultco assessors provided a summary score (on a scale 
of 0–100) for each assessment. 
Time between EPM assessments 
The EPM system digitally recorded the specific times that Consultco assessors evaluated a focal 
employee's performance. These digital records of the time between EPM assessments provided the 
difference between two consecutive assessments, measured in days. On average, 4.35 days passed 
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between any two consecutive EPM assessments. As a reference point, the time between EPM assessments 
was positively skewed; it was less than 10 days in most cases, which is consistent with industry standards 
(ICMI, 2005). 
Control variables 
Although calls were similarly complex, customer attitudes are likely to vary. For example, one customer 
checking an account balance may display a hostile attitude; another may be neutral. To control for 
potential effects of such variations on CSR performance and consequent assessor evaluations, the analysis 
controlled for both customer attitude at the initiation of the call and customer attitude at the end of the 
call. Trained Consultco assessors also coded customer attitudes—measured on a four-point scale 
(0 = negative to 3 = delighted). Furthermore, each CSR's prior performance (t – 1) was also controlled; 
the inclusion of a lagged measure of performance in model estimation helps to account for time-based 
dependencies arising from performance monitoring (see Ployhart & Hakel, 1998). 
 
Analysis Strategy 
In these data, CSRs' performance was measured over time, with CSRs nested within supervisors, which 
necessitated the use of multilevel modeling procedures (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In accordance, the 
intraclass correlation (ICC) values of .14 and .12 indicated that 14% of the variance in employee 
performance was at the CSR level and 12% of the variance was at the supervisor level, respectively (see 
Hox, 2010; Kim, 2009). To account for these interdependencies, multilevel models were estimated in 
STATA 10.0 to check whether employee performance deteriorated as time between EPM assessments 
increased. 
 
Results 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and within-person correlations. The time between two EPM 
assessments was expected to be negatively related to performance. Although negative, the bivariate 
correlation was not statistically significant (r = –.03, p > .05); note, however, that the bivariate correlation 
does not consider temporal effects and omitted variables. 
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Table 1. Study 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Within-Person Correlations 
    Mean SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Performance 81.97 5.42 –       
2. Lagged performance 81.94 5.44 .30 –     
3. Time between EPM 
assessments 
4.35 5.38 −.03 −.02 –   
4. Customer attitude at 
beginning of call 
1.19 .42 −.03 .00 .01 – 
5. Customer attitude at end 
of call 
1.37 .50 −.02 −.05 .06 .63 
 
Note 
N = 3,959. Customer attitudes at the beginning and at the end of the call were assessed on a five-point scale. 
Correlations are at the within-persons level. Correlations greater than |.03| are significant at p < .05. 
Multilevel results were supportive of Hypothesis 1: Time between EPM assessments was negatively 
related to task performance, b = –.04, p < .05, 95% CI [–.06, –.01], β = –.04. Note that these analyses 
control for the initial levels of CSR performance at the previous assessment period (see Table 2, Model 
2). 
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Table 2. Study 1 Multilevel Model Results of Performance 
  Performance 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Lagged performance .09** .09** 
Customer attitude at beginning of call −1.35** −1.37** 
Customer attitude at end of call .98** 1.02** 
Time between EPM assessments   −.04** 
Model deviance 23,839.10 23,832.72 
Note 
N = 3,959. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. The intercept is included in each model but 
omitted from the table. Model deviance = –2×log likelihood of the full maximum likelihood estimate. 
Following the smaller-is-better criterion, the model with the smaller deviance value indicates better model fit 
(Burnham & Anderson, 2002; Cavanaugh, 2005). 
**p < .05. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 provide a test for the hypothesis examining the relationship between the objective 
frequency of EPM assessments and task performance. Consistent with agency theory and social 
facilitation theory predictions, results indicate that shorter time lags between EPM assessments (more 
frequent use of EPM) are associated with better employee performance. These results suggest that more 
frequent monitoring would enable organizations to improve employee performance. 
The longitudinal data set gives Study 1 distinct methodological advantages enabling direct measures of 
time between performance assessments and an objective measure of frequency of EPM use. Moreover, 
Finco already had EPM systems and processes in operation before data collection, which made it difficult 
to establish a causal relationship between frequency of EPM and performance, but by accounting for 
temporal performance dependencies there is greater confidence in these results. In addition, the effects of 
performance feedback received at the previous assessment (t – 1) may influence performance at the 
current time (t). By controlling for performance at the previous timepoint, this potential effect of 
performance feedback has been captured in the analysis, which lends additional credibility to these 
findings. 
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Furthermore, in contrast to Finco supervisors, Consultco assessors do not directly interact with Finco's 
CSRs. Consequently, they are less likely to be biased in their evaluations than are supervisors who know 
CSRs personally. As numerous studies have previously noted, bias in performance evaluations is an 
important issue (Feldman, 1981; Landy & Farr, 1980), so third-party assessments offer advantages by 
avoiding potential distortions in the evaluation process. To that end, estimates of the relationship of time 
between EPM assessments and CSR performance will be robust, relatively unbiased, and immune to 
many common method concerns (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Finally, data in Study 
1 were not collected through a survey and were therefore relatively uncontaminated by issues such as 
social desirability and mood states of survey respondents (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
One concern in Study 1 is that, in large samples, even relatively small effects may be significant (see 
Combs, 2010). Results of Study 1 indicate that, all else being equal, an increase in each additional day 
between any two consecutive monitoring assessments is associated with a .04 point decrease in 
performance. Based on Ellis's (2010) advice, I interpret this effect size on the basis of the study's context 
and sample characteristics. Compare two EPM systems: one in which assessment is done on a daily basis, 
and a second in which assessment is done on a monthly basis. In the latter EPM system, the estimated 
drop in performance compared to the former system will be 1.2 points. This result is put in perspective by 
considering the standard deviation of performance. The observed standard deviation is low (SD = 5.42), 
which is consistent with previous research suggesting that performance ratings in a “strong” situation (one 
in which desirable behavior is clearly defined and highly consequential) generally exhibit range 
restriction (Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010). Given the low observed standard deviation, an estimated 
drop in performance of 1.2 points represents 22% of the standard deviation. In short, when the 
distribution of performance ratings is compressed, relatively small changes in performance scores capture 
meaningful differences in actual performance. 
Finally, a noteworthy feature of Study 1 is that it does not directly assess supervisory use of EPM; rather, 
external assessors used EPM to assess employees. Thus, although the study provides insight into the 
frequency of EPM use and its relationship with employee performance, it cannot identify the specific 
effects associated with supervisory use of EPM. Study 1 also provides no information on the association 
of EPM with other performance dimensions such as OCB and CWB. Study 2 aims to address those 
limitations and to more comprehensively test the hypotheses. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants, procedures, and setting 
Data were collected from call center units of two large organizations in a midwestern U.S. city. These call 
centers, which are specific divisions within larger organizations, provide billing, promotions, and related 
services to their customers. Both call centers handle in-bound transactions wherein customers initiate the 
calls. Multiple site visits at both organizations helped generate, clarify, and change items to terminology 
appropriate to the organization. As outlined below, I used three data sources: supervisors, CSRs, and 
EPM data provided by quality teams. The organizations provided an employee roster that enabled 
matching CSR data to supervisor and EPM data. 
Across these two organizations, I sent web-based surveys to 284 CSRs and received 204 completed 
surveys for a response rate of about 72%. Both organizations showed similar response rates. CSRs 
provided information on demographic attributes of age, gender, tenure, education, and employment status. 
Most respondents were female (72%), worked full time (84%), and averaged 37.6 years old (SD = 13.7). 
The average organizational tenure was 5.2 years (SD = 5.8). All CSRs had at least a high school degree, 
and 27% were college graduates. 
All supervisors (n = 24) completed both an individual web-based survey and paper survey for each of 
their subordinates, for a response rate of 100%. Most of the supervisors were female (66.7%) and 
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averaged 38.6 years old (SD = 9.7). All supervisors worked full time and possessed a high school degree 
or higher (33% were college graduates). The average organizational tenure was 9.2 years (SD = 8.2). On 
average, supervisors managed 12.9 CSRs (SD = 2.4) and monitored 3.7 (SD = 1.6) calls per CSR per 
month. 
In terms of monitoring procedures, both organizations followed similar processes of using electronic 
monitoring systems to continually collect information on performance metrics, such as average call 
handle time, total number of calls handled, and time on breaks. Both supervisors and CSRs had access to 
these performance metrics. Furthermore, supervisors monitored CSR calls through side-by-side sessions 
(supervisors sat next to the CSRs and listened while they spoke with customers), real-time remote 
listening (supervisors listened to CSR calls from their workstations), or digital voice recordings of prior 
CSR call transactions. 
Both organizations also had separate quality departments that independently electronically monitored and 
evaluated CSRs; like the supervisors, quality departments could access the calls in real time or through 
recordings. These departments evaluated at least four calls per agent per month on customer service 
behaviors—a number consistent with industry standards (ICMI, 2005). Quality departments provided a 
summary call quality metric based on the ratings of service behaviors and the performance metrics (e.g., 
average call handle time). Quality departments consisted of multiple raters, although each call was rated 
by only one rater. To ensure consistency of evaluation across work units, quality departments had 
periodic calibration sessions. In addition to their monitoring assessments, supervisors used ratings from 
the quality departments to provide feedback to their subordinate CSRs on multiple dimensions of call 
quality. Supervisors generally valued quality department evaluations in addition to their own evaluations 
because quality department ratings provided independent and relatively objective assessments. 
Measures 
Using a paper-based survey, supervisors evaluated each CSR on the three performance dimensions and 
provided information on their use of monitoring for each CSR, as well as the complexity of their calls. 
Supervisory use of EPM 
Discussions with organizational representatives complemented Wilk and Moynihan's (2005) approach, 
which inquires about supervisory levels of monitoring in call centers, and helped identify the specific 
forms of electronic monitoring that supervisors could use. This is consistent with EPM research that lists 
a set of monitoring techniques to assess EPM use (Stanton, 2000). Thus, supervisors reported on EPM use 
of (a) call monitoring systems that allow supervisors to view, for example, call handle times and call 
loads; (b) voice recording systems that enable call playback; (c) quality assurance metrics to evaluate 
calls; and (d) other electronic systems that generate performance data; for the last item, examples of 
specific systems in the organization, such as schedule adherence and attendance monitoring, were 
provided. All supervisors had access to these EPM techniques and could choose the frequency for using 
them. These items were assessed on a five-point (1 = never to 5 = always) Likert-type scale. Coefficient 
alpha for this scale was .87. 
Call complexity 
Because experimental EPM research (Davidson & Henderson, 2000; Griffith, 1993) and agency theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) have highlighted the relevance of task complexity in estimating the EPM–performance 
relationship, I controlled for the complexity of the calls handled by the CSR in the analysis. Based on 
Dean and Snell (1991), supervisors assessed the complexity of calls a focal CSR handled by answering: 
“How complicated are the calls handled by this representative?” This item was assessed on a seven-point 
scale (1 = among the most simple to 7 = among the most complex). 
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Task performance 
Task performance was assessed using four items from the “Job – doing things specifically related to one's 
job description” dimension of the role-based performance measure (Welbourne, Johnson, & Erez, 1998, 
p. 554). The items were assessed on a five-point scale (1 = needs much improvement to 5 = excellent). An 
example is “Quantity of work output,” and the coefficient alpha for this scale was .91. 
Organizational citizenship behaviors 
The Welbourne et al. (1998) measure was used to assess OCBs. Four items were assessed on a five-point 
scale (1 = needs much improvement to 5 = excellent). The items used were from the “Organization – 
going beyond the call of duty in one's concern for the firm” dimension (Welbourne et al., 1998, p. 554), 
which “parallels those behaviors associated with OCBs” (Welbourne et al., 1998, p. 543). An example: 
“Doing things that help others when it's not a part of his/her job.” The coefficient alpha for this scale was 
.95. 
Counterproductive work behaviors 
Five items that reflected loss in work productivity were selected from Bennett and Robinson's (2000) 
organizational deviance scale. The items were assessed on a five-point scale (1 = never to 5 = always). An 
example item is: “Takes an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace.” To 
appropriately suit the call center context, the wording of one item about fantasizing and daydreaming at 
work was revised to “Spends time surfing the Internet or on private phone calls.” The coefficient alpha for 
this scale was .86. 
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to determine whether the three performance dimensions were 
empirically distinct indicated that a three-factor solution exhibited superior fit: χ2(62) = 160.63, 
comparative fit index (CFI) = .95, root mean square of approximation (RMSEA) = .08, standardized mean 
square residual (SRMR) = .05, compared with a single-factor solution χ2(65) = 918.99, CFI = .53, 
RMSEA = .22, SRMR = .16. Overall, the three-factor model provided a significantly better fit than the 
one-factor model (Δχ2[3] = 256.46, p < .001). 
Call quality 
To evaluate call quality, both organizations had multiple dimensions (restricted by confidentiality 
agreements). In general, these dimensions covered various aspects of the call such as greeting, probing, 
closing, providing value, helping the customer, and documenting the transaction. Thus, elements of task 
performance were incorporated into the call quality score, which provides an alternative assessment of 
task performance by a different data source: quality teams. 
Call quality data were provided for a 4-month period, and an average of these evaluations for each CSR 
was computed. Technical issues (e.g., if the quality department monitored fewer than four calls) and 
administrative issues (e.g., employee absence) caused data to be missing for each month so that complete 
call quality data for all 4 months were not available. To counteract the randomly missing data (7.47%), a 
multiple imputation procedure across the 4-month time period was performed to retain the maximum 
number of call quality assessments (see Carlin, Galati, & Royston, 2008). This procedure follows 
Newman's (2009, p. 11) advice that emphasizes using “all of the available data” and recommends 
multiple imputation procedures because they are unbiased and have greater power. 
 
Analysis Strategy 
In these field data neither supervisory use of EPM nor CSR performance are randomly assigned to 
experimental conditions. Thus, in estimating the relationship between supervisory use of EPM and 
performance, the potential exists for endogeneity, which may lie in the simultaneity of the monitoring–
performance relationship. For instance, it may be unclear whether CSR performance is better because the 
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supervisor frequently uses electronic monitoring or whether the supervisor uses more electronic 
monitoring because of low CSR performance. When estimating a potentially simultaneous relationship, 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results may be biased and inconsistent because the OLS 
assumption that the error term be independent of the predictor variable may be violated 
(Wooldridge, 2002); in this situation, the internal validity of the study could be compromised (see 
Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test empirically assesses 
whether the predictor variable and the error term are correlated; if they are it implies that OLS-based 
estimates may be inconsistent and that two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates, which are consistent, 
should be used instead. Accordingly, the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test provided empirical evidence of the 
endogeneity of supervisory use of EPM (χ2 = 15.17, p < .01) and recommended the use of 2SLS methods 
for estimation (see Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002). 2SLS procedures—a general solution to mitigate 
endogeneity—are widely used in the field of economics, have also been employed in organizational 
research (e.g., Glomb & Liao, 2003; Schmitt & Bedeian, 1982), and are recommended to increase internal 
validity (Antonakis et al., 2010). In 2SLS regressions, potentially endogenous variables are “replaced” 
with instrumental variables to mitigate endogeneity concerns (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
Instrumental variables 
Four instrumental variables—assessed in a separate supervisor web survey—were created for supervisory 
use of EPM: the supervisor's tenure, dispositional propensity to trust, perceived usefulness of EPM, and 
perceived ease of use of EPM. The supervisor's tenure is indicative of their greater experience and 
familiarity with EPM systems and their use. Propensity to trust reflects a general willingness to trust 
others (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Supervisors’ propensity to trust would thus reflect their trust 
of employees prior to receiving any information on employees’ ability or performance. Supervisors 
responded to Mayer and Davis's (1999) nine-item scale assessing propensity to trust (1 = disagree 
strongly; 5 = agree strongly). The coefficient alpha was .65. This alpha value, though somewhat low, was 
similar to Mayer and Davis's originally reported .66 value. Supervisors also reported their perceptions of 
ease of use and usefulness of EPM, which strongly determine behavioral intentions to use a technology 
(Davis, 1989; Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989). Supervisors responded to Venkatesh's (2000) four-item 
measures for both perceived usefulness (e.g., “Using the system improves my performance in the job”) 
and perceived ease of use (e.g., “I find the system easy to use”; 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). 
In consideration of one organization's request to use specific items for this scale, only three items could 
be used for each dimension. The coefficient alpha values were similar between the four-item and three-
item versions of the scale. To ensure consistency across organizations, these three-item versions of the 
scale are used in the analysis. The coefficient alpha for perceived usefulness was .83 and for perceived 
ease of use was .77. The correlations of supervisory use of EPM with the instrumental variables were as 
follows: propensity to trust (r = .25), perceived usefulness (r = .25), perceived ease of use (r = .44), and 
supervisor's tenure (r = .27). These correlations were statistically significant (p < .01), and the average 
correlation of these four instrumental variables and supervisory use of EPM was .30. 
 
Testing the validity of instruments 
Valid instrumental variables must be (a) correlated with the endogenous variable that they are replacing 
and (b) uncorrelated with the error term in the equation (i.e., orthogonality condition). 
The first condition can be tested using the fit of the first stage regression, which is the regression of the 
endogenous variable (supervisory use of EPM) on the set of instrumental variables (Baum, 2006; 
Wooldridge, 2002). The recommended statistic here is to examine the F-test of the joint significance of 
the instruments in the first-stage regression (Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995) with the following rule: 
An F-test statistic below 10 potentially indicates that the first condition is not satisfied and that the 
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instruments have weak explanatory power (Staiger & Stock, 1997). Results supported adherence to the 
first condition of relevance of these instruments to explain the endogenous variable of supervisory use of 
EPM (F [6, 181] = 21.06, p < .01; R2 = .41). 
To test the second condition, the Sargan test for overidentification of instruments, where the null 
hypothesis suggests that the instrumental variables in the model are uncorrelated with the error term 
(Baum, 2006; Wooldridge, 2002), was performed for the outcome variable of task performance. By 
failing to reject the null hypothesis, results supported adherence to the second condition of orthogonality 
of the error term (χ2 = 7.18, p > .05) and provided additional evidence of the exogeneity of the 
instruments. Overall, these tests satisfied the two conditions of validity for instrumental variables (see 
Baum, 2006; Wooldridge, 2002, for additional methodological details). 
In testing the hypotheses, the nested structure of the data must also be accounted for: CSRs are nested 
within supervisors. Such nested models were estimated using the “cluster” function in STATA 10.0, 
which estimates a variance–covariance matrix with interdependent error terms across groups (supervisors) 
and independent error terms within groups (supervisors; Rogers, 1993; Wooldridge, 2002). That is, these 
models were estimated based on 2SLS procedures while simultaneously accounting for nested effects (for 
a similar application of the cluster procedure using 2SLS, see Glomb & Liao, 2003). 
 
Results 
Descriptive results 
As seen in Table 3, supervisory use of EPM was positively related to task performance (r = .18, p < .05) 
and OCB (r = .23, p < .05), but was unrelated to call quality (r = .05, p > .05) and CWB (r = –.03, p > 
.05). The correlations between the performance dimensions were as expected: task, OCB, and call quality 
were positively related to each other, and all were negatively related to CWB. 
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Table 3. Study 2 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
  Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Task 
performance 
3.97 .82 (.91)           
2. CWB 1.71 .73 −.29 (.86)         
3. OCB 3.87 .87 .73 −.27 (.95)       
4. Call 
quality 
90.43 4.55 .42 −.20 .37 –     
5. 
Supervisory 
use of EPM 
4.28 .91 .18 −.03 .23 .05 (.87)   
6. Call c 
omplexity 
5.32 1.14 .29 −.20 .27 .10 .31 – 
7. CSR 
tenure 
5.25 5.83 .07 −.15 .13 .02 .03 .05 
Note 
N = 186–204 (Listwise N = 172). CWB = counterproductive work behaviors; OCB = organizational citizenship behaviors; EPM = 
electronic performance monitoring; CSR = customer service representative. Task performance, CWB, OCB, and supervisory use 
of EPM were assessed on a five-point scale; call complexity was assessed on a seven-point scale. Internal consistency reliabilities 
are on the diagonal in parenthesis. Correlations greater than |.14| are significant at p < .05. 
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2SLS results 
Hypothesis 2 proposed a positive relationship between supervisory use of EPM and task performance 
(Table 4). The 2SLS estimate for supervisory use of EPM was positive and statistically significant (b = 
.36, p < .05, 95% CI [.02, .71], β = .41), providing support for Hypothesis 2. As mentioned previously, the 
performance outcome of call quality uses a different data source (i.e., quality departments) to test 
objectively the relationship between supervisory use of EPM and performance. The coefficient estimate 
for the relationship between supervisory use of EPM and call quality (b = 2.97, p < .05, 95% CI [.53, 
5.42], β = .53), was positive and statistically significant, providing additional support for Hypothesis 2.2  
 
Table 4. Study 2 Results of 2SLS Regression Analysis on Performance Outcomes 
  
Task 
performance 
CWB OCB Call quality 
Call 
complexity 
.10 −.08 .05 −.31 
CSR tenure .01 −.02* .02* −.00 
Supervisory 
use of EPM 
.36** −.02 .41** 2.97** 
F1 21.06** 21.19** 21.22** 16.16** 
F 3.82** 3.43** 6.85** 3.08** 
N 188 187 186 174 
Note 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. The intercept is included in each model but omitted from the table. 
Supervisory use of EPM is instrumented through supervisor's tenure, dispositional propensity to trust, perceived usefulness of 
EPM, and perceived ease of use of EPM. F1 represents the F-test for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage 
regression; an F-test statistic above 10 provides evidence of the relevance of the instruments (see Baum, 2006). F represents 
the F-test for the overall 2SLS model. EPM = electronic performance monitoring; CWB = counterproductive work behaviors; 
OCB = organizational citizenship behaviors; CSR = customer service representative. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. 
 
                                                          
2 Results for call quality for the raw data (nonimputed) were similar to those for the imputed data. The coefficient 
for supervisory use of EPM was positive and statistically significant for call quality (b = 5.19, p < .05, 95% CI [.66, 
9.73], β = .65). 
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Hypothesis 3 proposed a negative relationship between supervisory use of EPM and CWB. The 
coefficient estimate for supervisory use of EPM was negative but not statistically significant, b = –
.02, p > .05, β = –.02, thus failing to support Hypothesis 3. Research Question 1 sought to understand the 
relationship between supervisory use of EPM and OCB. The coefficient of supervisory use of EPM was 
positive and statistically significant (b = .41, p < .05, 95% CI [.08, .74], β = .44), indicating that 
supervisory use of EPM was associated with higher OCB. 
 
Discussion 
In this study, I examine how supervisors’ use of information from EPM systems relates to subordinates’ 
performance. Consistent with agency theory predictions, positive associations surface for supervisory use 
of EPM with task performance for different operationalizations of task performance: through supervisory 
evaluations of a CSR's performance, as well as through call quality evaluations based on EPM system 
data by a separate quality team. All else being equal, for each additional unit increase in supervisory use 
of EPM, task performance increases by .36 (on a five-point scale), and call quality increases by 2.97 
points (on a 100-point scale). 
Monitoring is considered a key mechanism to alleviate agency problems that are represented in CWBs. 
Although I anticipated a negative relationship between supervisory use of EPM and CWBs, the results 
failed to support such an association. Based on agency theory, I expected monitoring to be negatively 
related to OCBs. But the wider OCB literature and some prior empirical findings of EPM research 
suggested that supervisory use of EPM may be positively related to OCBs. Results indicated a positive 
relationship between supervisory use of EPM and OCBs, which align with this latter view. Although this 
result is desirable from an organizational perspective, I address the finding in the general discussion. 
Study 2 has some limitations. First, it was not possible to independently evaluate the validity of the call-
quality metrics, and so it was necessary to defer to organizational assessments of their suitability. Also 
unavailable was direct access to performance metrics, such as the average call time or number of calls 
handled by CSRs. But both supervisors and quality assessment teams had access to these metrics, which 
the quality assessment teams explicitly incorporated into their evaluations of call quality. 
Second, from a methodological standpoint, rather than the cross-sectional design employed here, a 
randomized field experiment design would mitigate the endogeneity problem discussed earlier 
(Antonakis, et al., 2010). Furthermore, because this study assesses supervisor perceptions of how 
extensively they monitor subordinates, this indicator of the frequency of monitoring is not objective. In 
addition, no objective measure identifies the time between monitoring assessments or indicates how this 
issue may relate to performance. Research indicates that effective supervisors monitor their subordinates’ 
performance more frequently than do noneffective supervisors (Komaki, 1986), and so precise 
measurement of time lags between monitoring assessments would strengthen these findings. Because 
Study 1 addresses these methodological limitations by objectively measuring time lags between 
monitoring assessments, it provides complementary evidence to Study 2 results. 
 
General Discussion 
Drawing on Adam Smith's metaphor, wherein the pursuit of individual self-interest stimulates the greater 
good through the social mechanism of an “invisible hand” (Smith, 1776/2003), in these studies I examine 
whether EPM functions as an “invisible eye” in aligning intraorganizational interests and facilitating 
employee performance. Consistent with predictions based on agency theory and social facilitation theory, 
EPM use and task performance show positive associations, as revealed in Study 1. Results indicate that as 
EPM is performed less frequently (i.e., more time lapses between EPM assessments), employees perform 
more poorly. This finding lends credence to Cottrell's (1972) social comparison explanation that 
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evaluation apprehension may heighten employees’ drive levels. Put simply, call center representatives, 
concerned about their performance assessments, are driven to work harder. This result dovetails Komaki's 
(1986) work in traditional monitoring demonstrating that frequent monitoring is effective supervisory 
behavior. This reasoning is also consistent with feedback research that emphasizes the criticality of timely 
feedback for employee performance (Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). If more time passes between EPM 
assessments, employees will fail to receive prompt feedback that they may need to improve performance 
(Ilgen et al., 1979; Komaki, 1986). 
Study 2 explicitly focuses on supervisory EPM use and reveals a positive relationship for different 
operationalizations of task performance (through supervisory evaluations of a CSR's performance and call 
quality evaluations based on EPM system data by a separate quality team). Overall, these results support 
prior experimental work (e.g., Davidson & Henderson, 2000; Kolb & Aiello, 1997) and are in accordance 
with agency theory: The better the ability to monitor employees, the better their task performance. 
Monitoring is considered a key mechanism to alleviate agency problems represented by CWBs, and thus I 
anticipated a negative relationship between EPM and CWBs. My study results, however, fail to support 
such an association. Empirical and contextual considerations potentially explain this result. Similar to 
other work on CWBs (e.g., Gruys & Sackett, 2003), the base-rate of CWBs was low (M = 1.71 on a five-
point scale) and so was the related variance (SD = .73). This modest variation could be an underlying 
reason for the lack of statistical significance. Also possible is that the lower base rate of CWBs is neither 
a rating error nor a statistical artifact but merely indicates lower manifestations of CWBs in this work 
environment. An examination of specific CWBs reveals that the most frequently observed 
counterproductive behavior is “spending time on the Internet or on private phone calls” (only 9.1%). 
Other CWBs observed are even lower, from 3.3% to 6.6%. These results suggest that electronic 
monitoring, coupled with the structured nature of work in a call center environment, would make it more 
difficult for employees to engage in CWBs. Of course, the prospect remains that observability of 
CWBs—“the Achilles’ heel of counterproductivity research” (Sackett, 2002, p. 7)—is limited; perhaps 
this electronically monitored setting fails to detect unique and unmeasured CWBs (see also, Hulin, 1991). 
Two divergent perspectives suggested alternate directions for the supervisory use of EPM–OCB 
relationship. Based on agency theory, I expected supervisory use of EPM to be negatively related to 
OCBs. Considering that CSRs must perform specific in-role behaviors, agency theory suggests that they 
would attend more acutely to the highlighted in-role behaviors and reduce their proclivity to perform 
OCBs. Research findings from the OCB and EPM literatures, however, suggested that supervisory use of 
EPM would be positively related to OCBs. Contrary to agency theory predictions, the results indicate a 
positive relationship between supervisory use of EPM and OCBs. Thus, because EPM systems highlight 
performance expectations, when emphasizing task performance they may also stress the importance of 
other performance facets, which is consistent with related EPM research findings (e.g., Davidson & 
Henderson, 2000; Grant & Higgins, 1989). Similar to results from traditional observational monitoring, 
therefore, supervisory use of EPM to monitor task performance may signal to employees the importance 
of performing OCBs (Larson & Callahan, 1990; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). This positive relationship 
between supervisory use of EPM and OCBs is also consistent with self-presentation theory that EPM's 
“electronic presence” would drive impression management behaviors (Baumeister, 1982). Simply by 
instituting EPM systems, organizations communicate the desired work behaviors to employees and induce 
processes of social comparisons that underlie social facilitation effects. 
Another possible reason for the positive relationship between supervisory use of EPM and OCBs is that 
the rater, in this case the supervisor, may influence results. Supervisors are likely to commit halo errors 
when evaluating their subordinates’ OCBs, in considering a “unitary” view of performance. That is, 
supervisors may assume a singular performance dimension to classify subordinates as either “good” or 
“bad” performers across other job dimensions (Campbell, 1990). This view, reflected in the high bivariate 
correlation between task performance and OCB (r = .73), is consistent with Hoffman and colleagues’ 
meta-analytic reports that OCB, though a separate dimension, is strongly related to task performance 
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(Hoffman, Blair, Meriac, & Woehr, 2007).3 Such an explanation is also consistent with the reasoning that 
task performance and OCBs are intertwined; OCBs contribute to a positive organizational context for 
facilitating task performance (Motowidlo, 2000; Organ, 1997; Rotundo & Sackett, 2002). 
 
Implications for Future Research 
The findings of this study offer theoretical refinements for EPM research from an agency theory 
perspective. Results suggest differences in how supervisors use information from EPM systems to ensure 
that CSR performance accords with the supervisor's desires. Because EPM systems grant all supervisors 
the same potential levels for information generation, this implies that supervisors vary in their information 
processing needs and/or in their judgment and decision making. Incorporating judgment and decision-
making aspects in an agency theory framework would be in accordance with research advances of 
modifying rational choice theory by integrating behavioral assumptions (see Mellers, Schwartz, & 
Cooke, 1998, for a review). In terms of future research, this indicates that supervisors’ judgment and 
decision-making attributes potentially influence the monitoring–performance relationship. A related need 
is to understand the roles of supervisory motivations (autonomy supportive or controlling; Deci, 
Connell, & Ryan, 1989) and personality traits such as the Dark Triad (machiavellianism, narcissism, and 
psychopathy; O'Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, & McDaniel, 2012) that may influence supervisors’ use of EPM. 
From an organizational design perspective, it will be opportune to more closely examine the different 
roles between supervisors and quality teams to understand how monitoring responsibilities should be 
distributed and how to best observe different aspects of employee performance (task, OCB, and CWB). 
Doing so may be particularly pertinent when investigating different dimensions of OCB (e.g., altruism, 
courtesy, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, and civic virtue; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & 
Fetter, 1990) and CWB (e.g., interpersonal deviance and organization deviance; Bennett & 
Robinson, 2000). At the same time, we must pay greater attention to levels of EPM use. Although the 
results of this study indicate a positive association between supervisory use of EPM and employee 
performance dimensions, excessively high levels of EPM use may be detrimental to employee 
performance on account of fairness and autonomy concerns (see Alder & Ambrose, 2005; Stanton & 
Barnes-Farrell, 1996). Examining potential nonlinear relations between EPM use and employee 
performance is therefore important (see Larson & Callahan, 1990). 
Another area for future research is to elucidate the dimensions and nature of providing EPM feedback, 
including feedback control, feedback constructiveness, and feedback medium (see Alder & 
Ambrose, 2005). Although frequent feedback is considered useful, the construct of frequency must be 
more thoroughly understood in light of some other related questions, such as whether frequent feedback is 
useful for performance improvement or whether a cognitive burden exists for both employees and 
supervisors based on the frequency of the feedback (whether daily, weekly, or monthly). An event-
contingent experience sampling study would provide an avenue for examining the dynamic between a 
supervisor's EPM assessment and an employee's response. Specifically, assessing employee attitudinal 
and performance reactions based on a supervisor's specific monitoring assessment in “real time” may 
inform issues related to cognitive loads and their effects. 
 
                                                          
3 Note that measures of task performance and OCB were drawn from an established scale (i.e., Welbourne, 
et al., 1998). In addition, confirmatory factor analysis—based on only these two performance dimensions—provided 
evidence that the two dimensions were empirically distinct. A two-factor solution was a superior fit, χ2(19) = 61.70, 
CFI = .96, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .05, compared with a single-factor solution χ2(20) = 229.29, CFI = .82, 
RMSEA = .20, SRMR = .09. 
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Implications for Practice 
The findings of this study offer practical suggestions for organizations seeking to balance the efficiencies 
of information collection through EPM systems and the sharing of information about employee 
performance. The variation in supervisory use of EPM information suggests that organizational efforts in 
generating data through EPM are not matched by resources for using and processing data, especially 
across different user groups within organizations. Supervisors are likely to face information overload 
from the data generated, thereby creating an additional cognitive burden when they use EPM systems. 
Additional organizational efforts should be directed at interpretation of performance data (see also, 
Kulik & Ambrose, 1993). 
To avoid information overload, organizational initiatives could focus on developing a key set of metrics 
combining different dimensions drawn from EPM data to create performance dashboards, or scorecards, 
for ease of data interpretation. Supervisory training in ensuring consistent data interpretation is also 
important from the perspective of ensuring equitable outcomes for CSRs. For this purpose, supervisory 
training could also encompass areas such as improving decision-making and coaching skills (see Liu & 
Batt, 2010). Finally, given the performance-driven culture in call center environments and economic 
pressures to reduce costs without compromising service quality, specific feedback will also be helpful for 
goal-setting (Locke & Latham, 1984) and achieving organizational performance objectives. Thus, another 
area for supervisory training would be interpreting and communicating feedback on employee 
performance. 
In conclusion, findings from two field studies provide evidence that EPM functions as an “invisible eye” 
in aligning intraorganizational interests and facilitating performance. Results indicate that the use of EPM 
systems is associated with performance benefits for organizations, specifically for increasing employees’ 
task performance and OCBs. 
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